This paper was first presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of Christian Ethics, Toronto School of Theology, Toronto, Ontario in January 1977. Robert Shelton aims to focus on the concept of 'right to health care,' its related principle, 'distributive justice' in an attempt to suggest 'where we are' at present and where we perhaps ought to be heading. The paper is divided into three parts, which in their turn explore the moral grounds, the US general public's (...) policy and the part justice and government are likely to play in the development and distribution of health care. He concludes by highlighting 'omissions', an intentional one of his own and the other a major gap in the literature. (shrink)

This paper attempts to explore a number of conceptual issues surrounding genetic testing. It looks at the meaning of the terms, genetic information and genetic testing in relation to the definition set out by the Advisory Committee on Genetic Testing in the UK, and by the Task Force on Genetic Testing in the USA. It argues that the special arrangements that may be required for the regulation of genetic tests should not be determined by reference to the nature or technology (...) of the test, but by considering those morally relevant features that justify regulation. Failure to do so will lead to the regulation of genetic tests that need not be regulated, and would fail to cover other tests which should be regulated. The paper also argues that there is little in the nature of the properties of gene tests, using DNA or chromosomes, that in itself justifies a special approach. (shrink)

Mr D. H. Mellor, in his article of this title in Religious Studies , Vol. 5 , distinguishes three senses of words such as ‘probable’ which might be used in a religious context, especially in that of attempted theistic proofs: statistical, subjective, and inductive probability. In each case he concludes that it is misleading to use these words in such contexts at all. With his discussion of the second I do not wish to quarrel; but there seem to me to (...) be serious defects in his discussions of the first and third. (shrink)

I propose to begin with some fairly unexciting and uncontroversial remarks about possibility-statements, and then in their light to examine two problems philosophers have raised about certain statements of this kind which might be made in Christian theology where it touches on the doctrine of the Incarnation.

The ‘traditional’ view among philosophical theologians, that God is eternal not merely in the sense of being everlasting but in the sense of being outside time altogether, has come under sharp criticism in recent years, both from biblical theologians and from philosophers. It is against the latter form of attack, particularly as represented by the detailed criticisms of Professor Nelson Pike, that I wish to try and defend the notion of a divine timelessness.

When philosophers approach philosophy of religion, they typically ask two questions: are there any sound arguments to prove the existence of God; and is talk about God even rationally intelligible? Theologians, for their part, primarily expound the meaning and relevance of Christianity. I am by profession a philosopher, but apart from Secs. VI and VII I am here writing as a puzzled twentieth-century man. My prime worry is whether we philosophers and theologians are beginning with the right questions.

The notion of autonomy commonly employed in medical ethics literature and practices is inadequate on three fronts: it fails to properly identify nonautonomous actions and choices, it gives a false account of which features of actions and choices makes them autonomous or nonautonomous, and it provides no grounds for the moral requirement to respect autonomy. In this paper I offer a more adequate framework for how to think about autonomy, but this framework does not lend itself to the kinds of (...) practical application assumed in medical ethics. A general problem then arises: the notion of autonomy used in medical ethics is conceptually inadequate, but conceptually adequate notions of autonomy do not have the practical applications that are the central concern of medical ethics. Thus, a revision both of the view of autonomy and the practice of “respect for autonomy” are in order. (shrink)

I have come to believe that the whole framework of our current thought is about to begin a long and radical transformation, based on what I shall call a new science of pure consciousness. The content of most of the matters to be considered by this science have hitherto been the concern of some areas of religion, particularly what in our culture we call ‘mysticism’; but the treatment of it would legitimately be called scientific. Thus one aspect of the transformation (...) would be to overcome that apparent conflict between ‘science’ and ‘religion’, which has been so characteristic of our culture over the last few centuries. (shrink)

To better understand the multiple individual factors that contribute to college cheating, we undertook a multivariate analysis of a national sample of 2,503 college students. Our findings indicated that demographic characteristics, character qualities, college experience, and student perceptions and attitudes are all significantly associated with academic cheating.

Background Central to the involvement of children in health research is the notion of risk. In this paper we present one of the factors, a matter of trust, that shaped Canadian parents' and children's perceptions and assessments of risk in child health research. Participants and methods Part of a larger qualitative research study, 82 parents took part an in-depth qualitative interview, with 51 parents having children who had participated in health research and 31 having children with no research history. 51 (...) children ranging from 6 to 19 years of age were also interviewed, with 28 having a history of participation in child health research and 23 having no history. Children also took part in 3 focus groups interviews. Themes emerged through a grounded theory analysis of coded interview transcripts. Findings The presence or absence of trust was not only perceived by parents and children as a contributing factor to involving children in health research, but also shaped their perceptions and assessments of risk. Three interrelated subthemes identified were: (1) relationships of trust; (2) placing trust in symbols of authority; and (3) the continuum of trust. Conclusions Our study reinforces that trust is an important factor when parents assess risk in child health research and shows that children use the language of trust in relation to risk. More discussion regarding trust in training researchers is warranted given the trust in researchers and institutions evident in this study. We also recommend further study of the continuum of trust in child health research. (shrink)

Sham surgery is a controversial and rarely used component of randomised clinical trials evaluating surgical interventions. The recent use of sham surgery in trials evaluating efficacy of intracerebral fetal tissue grafts in Parkinson’s disease has highlighted the ethical concerns associated with sham surgery controls. Macklin, and Dekkers and Boer argue vigorously against use of sham surgery controls. Macklin presents a broad argument against sham surgery controls while Dekkers and Boer present a narrower argument that sham surgery is unnecessary in the (...) specific setting of fetal tissue engraftment for Parkinson’s disease. I defend sham surgery controls against both these criticisms. Appropriate clinical trial design, sometimes including sham surgery, is needed to ensure that false positive trial results do not occur and endanger public safety. Results of a completed trial of fetal tissue grafting for Parkinson’s disease are used to illustrate the potential benefits of, and problems associated with, sham surgery controls. Sham surgery controls, however, should be employed only when absolutely necessary. I suggest criteria for appropriate use of sham surgery controls. (shrink)

I consider reasons for questioning ‘the laws of logic’, and suggest that these laws do not accord with everyday reality. Either they are rhetorical tools rather than absolute truths, or else Plato and his successors were right to think that they identify a reality distinct from the ordinary world of experience, and also from the ultimate source of reality.

Alberto Cortes, in [1], attempts to show that Leibniz's Principle of The Identity of Indiscernibles is a principle restricted to individuals, and that photons appear to violate L. L is stated by Leibniz as “no two substances are completely similar, or differ solo numero.” In second-order quantification theory with identity L becomes.

The proposition that a decreasing sequence of ordinals necessarily terminates has been given a new, and perhaps unexpected, importance by the rôle which it plays in Gentzen's proof of the freedom from contradiction of the “reine Zahlentheorie.” Gödel's construction of non-demonstrable propositions and the establishment of the impossibility of a proof of freedom from contradiction, within the framework of a certain type of formal system, showed that a proof of freedom from contradiction could be found only by transcending the axioms (...) and proof processes of that formal system. Gentzen's proof succeeds by utilisingtransfinite inductionto prove that certain sequences of reduction processes, enumerated by ordinals less than ε (the first ordinal to satisfy ε = ὡ) are finite. Were it possible to provethe restricted ordinal theorem, that a descending sequence of ordinals, less thanε, is finite, in Gentzen's “reine Zahlentheorie,” then it would be possible to determine a contradiction in that number system. In his paper, Gentzen proves the theorem of transfinite induction, which he requires, by an intuitive argument. There is also a method of reducing transfinite induction, for ordinals less than ε, to a number-theoretic principle given by Hilbert and Bernays, and a similar method by Ackermann. None of these proofs of transfinite induction isfinitist. (shrink)

‘Jason…chosen leader because his superior declines the honour, subordinate to his comrades, except once, in every trial of strength, skill, or courage, a great warrior only with the help of magical charms, jealous of honour but incapable of asserting it, passive in the face of crisis, timid and confused before trouble, tearful at insult, easily despondent, gracefully treacherous in his dealings with the love-sick Medea but cowering before her later threats and curses, coldly efficient in the time-serving murder of an (...) unsuspecting child , reluctant even in marriage.’ So Carspecken put the case against Jason's heroism. In the face of such an indictment, Lawall's plea in mitigation, ‘it must be admitted that [Jason] often reveals the qualities of a true gentleman’, seems somehow inadequate. Criticism since Carspecken has found various overlapping categories for Jason which both take account of the earlier negative judgements and preserve the centrality of his ‘personality’ and character in the poem: Jason is the quiet diplomat who works through consensus rather than force, his is a heroism of sex-appeal, he is an anti-hero, the embodiment of Sceptic ‘suspension of judgement’, or, alternatively, he is ‘one of us’, credible and lifelike. Carspecken himself tried a different tack: the poem is concerned not with individual heroism but with the heroism of the group. (shrink)